Tag Archives: BGP

BGP Path Hunting and Exploration ..

It has been shown through various studies that BGP convergence can be roughly given by the following formula:

Convergence = (Maximum AS_PATH – Minimum AS_PATH) x MRAI (MinimumRouteAdvertisementInterval)

MRAI as per the specification is the amount of time that a BGP speaker will wait before passing on successive route updates for the same prefix – it defaults to 30 seconds, and applies to all announcements, with no exemption for withdrawals. Since there can be some variance in the MRAI across different BGP implementations the convergence time is roughly given by the above formula.

Lets see how we arrive at this. Consider the topology as show in the fig 1 below:

Network Topology

Figure 1: Network Topology

A, B, C, D and E are all routers in ASes A, B, C, D and E respectively. Assume that A has announced its reachability to 10/8 and all routers have converged. This implies that E has the following paths for 10/8 in its adj-RIBs-In:

p(B) -> AS_PATH {B A} (path learnt from B)

p(C) -> AS_PATH {C B A} (path learnt from C)

p(D) -> AS_PATH {D C B A} (path learnt from D)

In steady state E would advertise 10/8 with AS_PATH {E B A}

Lets see what happens when A loses its connection to the network 10/8.

A announces a withdrawal for 10/8 to B as shown in figure 2.

Figure 2

Figure 2

B runs its decision process and finds that there is no other route to 10/8, and thus sends an explicit withdrawal to its peers C and E.

E upon receiving the withdrawl runs its decision process and finds that the best route, now available for 10/8 is the one that it learnt from C – the one with the AS_PATH {C B A}. It installs this route in the FIB and advertises this, as shown in figure 3.

Figure 3

Figure 3

E switches to the next best route (via C) and continues to forward traffic for 10/8. It should however be noted, that E at this point of time, has absolutely no idea that C too has received a withdrawal for 10/8.

C meanwhile runs its decision process and decides to send an explicit withdrawal to its peers D and E.

E upon receiving the withdrawal from C runs its decision process and finds that it still has a valid path to reach 10/8 – the one via D (refer to figure 4). It switches to this path, again unaware that D too has received an withdrawal for 10/8.

Figure 4

Figure 4

D now sends a withdrawal to E, and thereby removing all possible paths to 10/8 from E (fig 5). Its now that the network is converged.

Figure 5

Figure 5

What we just saw happening above on E is “BGP Path Hunting”. i.e., BGP “hunts” though all possible AS paths, starting from the shorter ones to the longer ones, until it finally converges.

It can be easily proven that the amount of path hunting will increase as the meshiness of the topology increases. In an acyclic topology (say a tree) there is only one possible path so there is no path hunting. An addition of a single link in this topology creates a cycle in the graph and thus at most two possible paths for BGP to “hunt”. Subsequent links can add many more alternate paths for BGP to hunt, depending on where they’re placed in the graph.

In the worst possible case path hunting in BGP can explore every possible path of each path length. More commonly it has been observed that path hunting in today’s Internet can add an additional 2 or 3 BGP updates to a prefix withdrawal.

AboveNet Hijacks Africa Online!

Internet, only a few weeks ago, had seen Pakistan Telecom Authority (PTA) hijacking the IP prefixes announced by Youtube, as protest against some videos that had been put up there, knocking millions off, all around the globe from accessing Youtube. I wrote about this here. This time its an ISP from USA and Europe, AboveNet (AS 6461) thats hijacked prefix announced and owned by Africa Online (AS 36915).

AboveNet inexplicably started announcing reachability to one of the prefixes ( owned by Africa Online. It took AboveNet more than 22 hours since the problem was first reported, to fix it. Wonder what took them so long! As a result of this prefix hijack, potentially millions of users in Kenya or Africa, all behind, lost connectivity to the Internet. In isolation is not a huge space, but add a couple of NATs and the number of users easily swells to millions. What this means for you and me, who are not being served by Africa Online is, that we lose connectivity to all the websites being hosted behind this IP address block. Imagine what it would do to the Internet if emergency services, banks, google were being hosted there!

Lets see why users in Kenya would lose total connectivity to the Internet:

A user accesses google.com with a (NATed or otherwise) source IP address 194.9.82.x. Google graciously responds, and the IP packet carries the destination IP 194.9.82.x. Because AboveNet has announced reachability to this IP address block, all traffic destined to 194.9.82.x comes to AboveNet where it gets royally dumped, while the user sitting in Kenya (or Africa) is still hopelessly waiting for the packet to arrive.

So, why are the service providers all over the world preferring the route announcement from AboveNet over the one originated from Africa Online?

Well, thats unfortunately how Internet, and my favorite routing protocol – BGP, works!

In BGP, the route advertisement from the provider which has a better vantage point on the Internet, usually wins.

In this particular case both AboveNet(AS 6461) and Africa Online (AS 36915) announced the route to . AboveNet, operating from US, sits much closer to the core as compared to Africa Online, and is thus better connected to the other networks than the latter. The AS_PATH length thus seen by the other service providers for the route advertised by AboveNet is much shorter than the one advertised by Africa Online. As a result of this, other BGP speakers pick up the route advertised by AboveNet against the route advertised by Africa Online.

The figure below, constructed using BGPlay from RIPE NCC, shows a snapshot of the routing activity for during the period when it was hijacked. The colored lines indicate the path different ASes would take to reach this prefix. Clearly most of the ASes believed AboveNet to be a better path for

Vantage Point on the Internet

This is how BGP works and mind you, this isnt broken.

Whats broken is our disability to verify the claim of a service provider when it announces ownership of an address block in BGP. Restrictive route filtering can be applied where the providers only accept the specific prefixes allocated to the customers or where the upstream accepts only specific prefixes allocated to the ISPs, but this is too cumbersome and rarely works. As the matter stands today, there isn’t any clean way to know if the reachability announced by your friendly peer is genuine or whether the provider has a feasible path to the destinations advertised. This needs to be fixed and there is work going on towards this direction in the SIDR WG of IETF.

Can the service providers do something when they learn that an IP prefix has been hijacked by some AS? The answer, fortunately, to this is an unequivocal Yes.

A service provider can override BGP’s decision process in selecting the route advertisement with the shortest AS_PATH length by (i) manipulating the BGP path attribute like LOCAL_PREF since its checked before the AS_PATH length or (ii)¬† decreasing the weight of the offending peer you learn the hijacked route from (this would only work for routers connected¬† directly to AboveNet) (iii) Use regular expressions to filter all or the specific hijacked route advertisement from AS 6461 (AboveNet) so that the announcement from Africa Online wins. The legitimate route is now propagated to other parts of the world.

Each time an ISP inadvertently hijacks someone else’s address block it risks to lose some amount of credibility in the service provider world. Their names are splashed on the mails/PPTs in NANOG and IETF whenever there’s a discussion on interdomain security or on the blogs all over the world.

Fortunately for AboveNet, their hijacking didn’t throw millions off popular websites like Youtube, Google, Yahoo! etc. That would have attracted a LOT more attention than what this event did. When PTA had hijacked YouTube, it was all over the news and there were columns running in Wall Street Journal and New York Times about how tenuous the Internet architecture is. Also what unfortunately went in favor of AboveNet was that the affected users were not in US/Europe/Japan, but were in a relatively silent African subcontinent.

Issues with existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing Protocols

Most of us believe that using cryptographic authentication methods (MD5, etc) for the routing protocols running inside our networks really makes them very secure. Well, not really ..

We have published RFC 6039 that explains how each routing protocol can be exploited despite using the cryptographic authentication mechanisms endorsed by the IETF community.

To cite an example, a simple IP header attack on OSPF or RIP can result in the two adjacent routers bringing down the peering relationship between them. This can, in the worst case, blackhole a substantial amount of data traffic inside the network, something that will certainly not go well with the customers!

So how can an OSPF adjacency be brought down?

OSPF neighbors on the broadcast, NBMA and point-to-multipoint networks are identified by the IP address in the IP header. Because the IP header is not covered by the MAC in the cryptographic authentication scheme as described in RFC 2328, an attack can be made exploiting this vulnerability.

R1 sends an authenticated HELLO to R2. This HELLO is captured and replayed back to R1, changing the source IP in the IP header to that of R2.

R1 not finding itself in HELLO would deduce that the connection is not bidirectional and would bring down the adjacency!

The RFC also discusses some issues that we found with Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) protocol thats very frequently used in the service provider networks.