Can we solve the inter-session replay attacks?


Most routing (OSPF, BFD, RIP, OSPFv3-AT, etc) and signalling (LDP, RSVP, etc) protocols defined by IETF have a cryptographic sequence number within the authentication data that increases monotonically with each new packet that the router originates. This protects the protocol from replay attacks as the receivers now keep track of the sequence numbers and ignore all packets that arrive with a number thats lower than the currently active one.

At worst, the attacker can keep replaying the last packet that was originated since most protocols accept packets with sequence number greater than or equal to what they had last received. This in my opinion is a hole that can be trivially plugged by mandating that protocols must only accept protocol packets if they come with a sequence number thats greater than what they have received till now.

So does this solve all replay attacks problem?

No, not really.

Imagine an attacker who captures a protocol packet when the cryptographic sequence number is say, 1000.  Now the next time this router cold boots it will reinitialize its sequence space to 1 and start sending packets from this value. The attacker can now replay the earlier captured packet – the one with the sequence number 1000. The receivers will accept the replayed packet since it comes with a sequence number thats higher than what they were currently seeing from the router. This is a vulnerability that most IETF protocols are susceptible to. This is not an issue with protocols that use an automated key management protocol (like IKEv2) as all the security parameters are renegotiated when a session bounces. However, most routing and signalling protocols DONT use an automated key management protocol and are thus exposed to this risk.

I call this as an inter-session replay attack where packets from the previous/stale sessions can be replayed. So, do we have a solution to this problem?

Well, there are a couple of things that we could do here. The most obvious solution is to update the last cryptographic sequence number in the non volatile memory of the router. Thus we update the memory each time we increment the sequence number. This can be read when the router cold boots and it can start using sequence numbers from this value. The problem with this solution is that this will involve frequent writes to the non volatile memory on the routers which is not recommended because of the limited life of such media.

The other solution is to use the clock (number of seconds elapsed since midnight UTC  January 1 1970) as the sequence numbers. In theory this time will always advance and we will thus never have a router issuing sequence numbers that will ever go back. This would ideally also work when the router reboots as the time would only have advanced. The problem with this solution is that we end up relying on NTP or 1588 and an assumption that clocks on a router will NEVER go back. This is unrealistic and cannot be the basis of a security system defined for any protocol. Its fragile and can be broken.

So what are we left with?

Sam Hartman, Dacheng Zhang and I start looking at this problem for OSPF and have written an IETF draft that we think addresses this problem. It associates two scalars with a router – the Session ID and the Nonce, and uses these in combination with the cryptographic sequence numbers to protect OSPF routers against inter and intra replay attacks. The mechanism described in this draft can be easily generalized and extended to other routing and signalling protocols.

This is currently being discussed actively in the OSPF WG and the KARP WG mailing lists. I will in some other post explain how the concept of Nonce and Session ID helps in solving the inter-reply attacks which is the key problem that needs to be solved.

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About Manav Bhatia

Manav Bhatia is a SDN/NFV dataplane architect at Ionos Networks and has co-authored several IETF standards on routing protocols, BFD, IPv6, security, etc. He is also a member of IETF Routing Area Directorate where he helps the Area Directors review the IETF standards for their impact on the Routing Area. View all posts by Manav Bhatia

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